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We construct quantummechanical observables and unitary
operators which, if implemented in physical systems as mea-
surements and dynamical evolutions, would contradict the
Church-Turing thesis which lies at the foundation of com-
puter science. We conclude that either the Church-Turing
thesis needs revision, or that only restricted classes of observ-
ables may be realized, in principle, as measurements, and that
only restricted classes of unitary operators may be realized,
in principle, as dynamics.
PACS No. 03.65.Bz
Quantum mechanical measurements on a physical sys-
tem are represented by observables - Hermitian operators
on the state space of the observed system. It is an impor-
tant question whether all observables may be realized, in
principle, as measurements on a physical system. Dirac’s
influential text ( [1], page 37) makes the following asser-
tion on the question:
The question now presents itself – Can every observ-
able be measured? The answer theoretically is yes. In
practice it may be very awkward, or perhaps even beyond
the ingenuity of the experimenter, to devise an apparatus
which could measure some particular observable, but the
theory always allows one to imagine that the measure-
ment can be made.
This Letter re-examines the question of whether it is
possible, even in principle, to measure every quantum
mechanical observable. Unexpectedly, ideas from com-
puter science are crucial to the analysis. We also inves-
tigate a related question, namely, whether it is possible
to realize, in principle, the dynamics corresponding to an
arbitrary unitary operator on the state space of a quan-
tum system. Of course, for specific systems particular
measurements and unitary dynamics may be forbidden
by system specific features, such as superselection rules.
We will not be concerned with such specific features, but
rather with general considerations.
In the remarkable paper which founded modern com-
puter science, Turing [2] defined a class of functions which
are now known as the recursive or computable functions.
The Church-Turing thesis [3,2] of computer science states
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that this class of functions corresponds precisely to the
class of functions which may be computed via what hu-
mans intuitively call an algorithm or procedure. More
formally,
Every function which can be computed by what we
would naturally regard as an algorithm is a computable
function, and vice versa.
The Church-Turing thesis is fundamental to theoreti-
cal computer science, since it asserts that the mathemat-
ical class of functions studied by computer scientists, the
computable functions, is the most general class of func-
tions which may be calculated using a computer. It is
an empirical statement, not a theorem of mathematics,
and has been verified through over sixty years of test-
ing [4,5]. For a review of different formulations of the
Church-Turing thesis, see [4].
For convenience we refer to computable partial func-
tions of a single non-negative integer as programs. That
programs are only partial functions means that there
may be some values of the input for which no output
is defined. An example of a program is the function
f(x) = x2, which may be computed using a suitable
Turing machine. Using Turing’s results it is possible
to show [6] that the set of programs may be numbered
0, 1, 2, 3, . . .. Not all programs need to terminate or halt
for all possible inputs. A simple example is the program
f which on input x loops forever if x is not a perfect
square, or prints
√
x if x is a perfect square. This is an
example of a partial function.
The question of whether or not a given program, num-
bered x, halts on the input of y is obviously a question of
considerable practical importance: we would like to know
whether a given algorithm will terminate or not. To un-
derstand this question better, Turing defined a function,
the halting function, h, by
h(x) ≡
{
1 if programxhalts on input x;
0 if programxdoes not halt on inputx.
(1)
Turing [2] demonstrated that the halting function is not a
computable function. That is, there exists no algorithmic
means for computing the value of the halting function for
all values x = 0, 1, . . .. Thus there is no algorithm for
determining whether a given program terminates or not.
Many non-computable functions other than the halt-
ing function are now known, and the reasoning which
follows applies to any such function h. For concreteness
we continue to imagine that h is the halting function.
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We define the halting observable, hˆ, by
hˆ ≡
∞∑
x=0
h(x)|x〉〈x|, (2)
where |x〉 is an orthonormal basis for the state space of
some physical system with a countably infinite dimen-
sional state space. We will suppose that the system is
one such that all the states |x〉 may be prepared, in prin-
ciple. For example, the states |x〉 might be number states
of a single mode of the electromagnetic field. The halting
observable is clearly an observable in the usual quantum
mechanical sense: it is a Hermitian operator on the state
space of the system of interest.
Logically, one of two possibilities must hold:
1. It is possible, in principle, to construct a measuring
device capable of performing a measurement of the
observable hˆ.
2. It is not possible, in principle, to construct a mea-
suring device capable of performing a measurement
of the observable hˆ.
Suppose the first possibility is true. Then in order to
compute the value of h(x) one performs the following
procedure: Construct the measuring apparatus to mea-
sure hˆ, and prepare the system to be measured in the
state |x〉. Now perform the measurement. With prob-
ability one the result of the measurement will be h(x).
This gives a procedure for computing the halting func-
tion. If one accepts the Church-Turing thesis this is not
an acceptable conclusion, since the halting function is not
computable.
Acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis therefore
forces us to conclude that the second option is true,
namely, that it is not possible, in principle, to construct
a measuring device capable of performing a measurement
of the observable hˆ. That is, only a limited class of ob-
servables correspond to measurements which may be per-
formed, in principle, on quantum mechanical systems.
An important question arises: to determine the precise
class of observables which may be realized as measure-
ments.
Might it be possible to perform an approximate mea-
surement of hˆ? Suppose it is possible to measure an
observable hˆ′ which is close to hˆ. Preparing the system
in the state |x〉 and measuring hˆ′, a result in the range
h(x) ± δ is obtained with probability at least 1 − ǫ, for
some small ǫ and δ. Clearly, by performing repeated
measurements of this type it is possible to determine
h(x) with arbitrarily high confidence. Thus, approximate
measurements of hˆ give an algorithmic means for com-
puting h(x). Once again, if we accept the Church-Turing
thesis then we are forced to conclude that it is not possi-
ble to perform such an approximate measurement. Note,
however, that we are implicitly using a stronger version
of the Church-Turing thesis than hitherto, since now we
are regarding as an algorithm a procedure which out-
puts h(x) with arbitrarily high confidence, rather than a
purely deterministic procedure.
This second conclusion should be compared to work
by Wigner [7], and Araki and Yanase [8] on the WAY
theorem [9]. The WAY theorem shows that if we require
certain conservation laws to be respected during the mea-
surement process, then there are restrictions on the class
of observables which may be realized using measuring de-
vices. This is fundamentally different to the conclusion
we have obtained, which does not depend on the impo-
sition of externally imposed conservation requirements.
Another difference is that it was shown in [8] and [10]
that it is possible to perform approximate measurements
of the observables forbidden realization as measurements
by the WAY theorem. As we have already seen, approx-
imate measurements of hˆ are not allowed by the Church-
Turing thesis.
Up to this point we have considered the physical real-
ization of measurements corresponding to quantum me-
chanical observables. Similar arguments apply also to
the physical realization of unitary operators as dynami-
cal evolutions. Define a function g as follows:
g(x) ≡


2m− 2 if x is themth smallest non-negative
integer such thath(x) = 0
2m− 1 if x is themth smallest non-negative
integer such thath(x) = 1.
(3)
It is easy to verify that the operator
U ≡
∞∑
x=0
|g(x)〉〈x| (4)
is unitary. Suppose we prepare the system in the state
|x〉, perform the unitary dynamics U , and then do a mea-
surement in the |x〉 basis with outcome x′ (note that
there are systems where such a measurement can cer-
tainly be done, in principle, such as a single mode of the
electromagnetic field). Note that x′ is even if and only
if h(x) = 0 and x′ is odd if and only if h(x) = 1, so
this gives a procedure for computing the halting func-
tion. Once again, logically, one of two possibilities must
hold:
1. It is possible, in principle, to construct a system
whose dynamics is described by the unitary opera-
tor U .
2. It is not possible, in principle, to construct a sys-
tem whose dynamics is described by the unitary
operator U .
Once again, if we accept the Church-Turing thesis then
we are forced to the second conclusion: there are uni-
tary operators which do not describe the dynamics of
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any system which can, even in principle, be constructed.
By arguments similar to those used for observables, it is
easy to see that an approximate dynamical realization of
U can also be used as part of a procedure for evaluating
the halting function, so acceptance of the Church-Turing
thesis implies that approximate realizations of U are not
possible, either.
The examples we have discussed take place in infinite
dimensional state spaces. A similar construction for a
spin 12 system starts by defining (see chapter seven of
[11] for a review of definitions along these lines, and ref-
erences)
Ω ≡
∑
x:h(x)=1
1
2x
. (5)
Note that 0 < Ω < 1, and that the xth bit in the binary
expansion of Ω is one if and only if h(x) = 1, so knowing
the binary expansion of Ω is equivalent to knowing h(x)
for all x. Define U ≡ exp(−iΩσy). Starting the system in
the | 12 , 12 〉 state (spin up in the z direction) and applying
the dynamics U we see that the state after the dynamics
is
cos(Ω)|1
2
,
1
2
〉+ sin(Ω)|1
2
,−1
2
〉. (6)
By repeatedly performing this procedure and making
measurements of σz we may determine cos(Ω) and thus Ω
to any desired accuracy, with arbitrarily high confidence.
It follows that we can determine the value of h(x) for
all x. Once again, if we accept the Church-Turing thesis,
then we are forced to conclude that U cannot be realized.
Notice that, unlike the earlier examples, this procedure
is not stable under perturbations of U . A slight change
in U can result in an incorrect evaluation of h(x). Physi-
cally, uncontrolled interactions with the environment will
necessarily mean that U is not implemented exactly, and
thus it is not possible to evaluate the halting function
using a dynamical realization of U . Based on similar ar-
guments it seems likely, though I know of no rigorous
general proof, that any finite dimensional construction
which allows evaluation of a non-computable function is
unstable against perturbations, and therefore is not phys-
ically interesting.
Returning to the two physically interesting infinite di-
mensional examples, what conclusions can be drawn?
There are two programs one might pursue.
The first program is to modify the Church-Turing the-
sis. Perhaps there exist in nature quantum processes
which can be used to compute functions which are clas-
sically non-computable. It is far-fetched, but not logi-
cally inconsistent, to imagine some type of experiment -
perhaps a scattering experiment - which can be used to
evaluate the halting function.
Recognizing such a process poses some problems. How
could we verify that a process computes the halting func-
tion (or any other non-computable function)? Because of
the unsolvability of the halting problem, it is not possi-
ble to verify directly that the candidate “halting process”
is, in fact, computing the halting function. Nevertheless,
one can imagine inductively verifying that the process
computes the halting function. One would do this by
running a large number of programs on a computer for a
long time, and checking that all the programs which halt
are predicted to halt by the candidate halting process,
and that programs predicted not to halt by the candidate
halting process have not halted. Given sufficient empir-
ical evidence of this sort, one could then postulate as a
new physical law that the process computes the halting
function.
What types of modification of the Church-Turing the-
sis might be considered in this program? One approach
is to exclude quantum phenomena by fiat from the area
of application of the thesis. Approaches of this type have
numerous problems. First, the boundary between quan-
tum and classical phenomena is rather fuzzy; where pre-
cisely does one draw the line? Second, the approach is ad
hoc; what motivates the rejection of quantum phenomena
from the area of application of the Church-Turing thesis?
Many other modifications of the Church-Turing might be
attempted, however we will not discuss them here, as no
fully satisfactory modification has been found by the au-
thor.
It is the author’s conjecture that the Church-Turing
thesis is essentially correct, and that a more satisfactory
program is to address the problem of achieving a sharp
characterization of the class of observables and unitary
dynamics which may be realized in physical systems. At
least two properties must be satisfied by such a charac-
terization:
1. It should be consistent with a (possibly sharpened)
form of the Church-Turing thesis.
2. It should be clear that the measurements and dy-
namics contained in that class are, in principle, re-
alizable, and that all other measurements and dy-
namics could never be realized, even in principle,
in the laboratory.
How might one achieve such a characterization?
Deutsch [12] has proposed what he calls the Church-
Turing principle, to distinguish it from the less well for-
mulated Church-Turing thesis. The statement of this
principle reads:
Every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly
simulated by a universal model computing machine oper-
ating by finite means.
Note that finite means here has the meaning that on
any given computation finite computational resources are
used. As for classical computers, unbounded resources
are in principle available, provided only finite resources
are used on any given computation. Finitely realizable is
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being used in the same sense as we have used realizable: in
principle, the system can be constructed in a laboratory.
Given such a universal machine, the problem of study-
ing what classes of measurements and dynamics are re-
alizable is reduced to the study of properties of a single
physical system, the universal computing machine, since
that system can be used to simulate all other finitely re-
alizable physical systems. This reduction to studying the
properties of a single system may make it considerably
easier to study the classes of measurements and dynamics
which are realizable.
For example, Deutsch showed that his proposed uni-
versal computing machine can not compute any function
which is not computable on a classical computer. Thus,
his machine can not compute the halting function. But,
if we assume that the halting observable can be measured
using some physical system, then by the Church-Turing
principle the measurement could be simulated on a uni-
versal computing machine, and the result of the mea-
surement determined. This contradicts Deutsch’s asser-
tion that such a machine can not compute any function
which is not computable classically, and we conclude that
measurements of the halting observable are not possible,
in principle. Thus, if we accept that Deutsch’s proposed
machine satisfies the Church-Turing principle then it fol-
lows that the halting observable can not be measured.
What is gained by using arguments based on the
Church-Turing principle instead of arguments based on
the Church-Turing thesis, is that it may be possible to
prove the Church-Turing principle within known physi-
cal theory, for a suitable universal model computing ma-
chine. Unfortunately, it is not clear to this author that
the theory of quantum computation (see [13–15] for a re-
view), which has developed from Deutsch’s original pro-
posal, provides a candidate universal model computing
machine. In particular, it is not clear that the finite di-
mensional state spaces accessed by quantum computers
are sufficient to simulate, with arbitrary accuracy, all the
processes one finds in nature. Natural processes may
take place in infinite dimensional state spaces, and it is
has not been demonstrated that all such processes can be
well simulated using a system with only a finite number of
state space dimensions. Regardless of whether quantum
computers satisfy the Church-Turing principle, it is cer-
tainly the case that the specification of a universal model
computing machine satisfying the Church-Turing princi-
ple, besides being important in its own right, would also
greatly simplify the question of characterizing the classes
of measurements and dynamics which are realizable in
physical systems.
This Letter has discussed two questions: what class of
observables may be realized as quantum measurements;
and what unitary operators may be realized as quan-
tum dynamics. Using concepts from computer science
we have constructed observables and unitary operators
whose physical implementation would contradict the fun-
damental Church-Turing thesis of computer science. We
conclude that the introduction of new concepts into com-
puter science, physics, or both, is necessary to resolve this
contradiction.
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